Ironies of Aasia Bibi’s Pakistan

Ironies of Aasia Bibi’s Pakistan



Najam Sethi's E d i t o r i a l

The Aasia Bibi blasphemy case has caught the world’s headlines because it is full of desperate and nasty ironies. She is a Christian mother of two children, sentenced to death in a Muslim country that is notorious for making and practicing laws that persecute its minorities even as its official state religion of Islam proclaims special protection for them; whose citizens “hate” the West even as they line up outside Western embassies for work, education and tourist visas; whose governments shamelessly clamour for financial handouts from Western aid agencies even as they roundly condemn the “begging-bowl syndrome”; whose military establishment provides “safe havens” for Al-Qaeda-Taliban terrorists in North Waziristan even as it fights them in South Waziristan and Swat; whose security posture compels its strategic US ally to look upon it as both the problem and the solution for the war in Afghanistan.

Aasia’s crime: an allegedly blasphemous and angry retort to some Muslim village women who taunted her faith and her low caste by refusing to drink water from a utensil tainted by her “unclean” infidel hands. She was imprisoned for a year during trial and sentenced to death by a magistrate quaking in fear of the mullahs. The Punjab law minister, Rana Sanaullah, says that Aasia’s conviction is a miscarriage of justice. But there is deep irony here. Mr Sanaullah’s PMLN party rules in Punjab province. He has close links with hard line religious groups. In 1992, his PMLN was in power in Islamabad and mandated the death sentence for blasphemy.

At least two judges have been assassinated in the past for acquitting victims of the blasphemy laws and thirty two persons have been “extra-judicially killed” by mobs on the spot, inside prisons or outside courtrooms. According to the National Commission for Law and Justice, from the mid 1980s, when the blasphemy laws were enlarged under the regime of General Zia ul Haq, to 2009, over 960 people have been thus charged, among them 479 Muslims, 340 Ahmedis (who are prosecuted for insisting they are Muslims), 119 Christians, 14 Hindus and various others. An overwhelming 70% of such cases are situated in the “settled” areas of Punjab province. Of the nearly 2 million Christians in Pakistan, nearly half live in seven settled districts of Punjab, namely Lahore, Faisalabad, Sialkot, Qasur, Gujranwala, Sheikhupura and Toba Tek Singh.

The Penal Code was established by the British Raj in 1860. In 1927, the law for offenses against religion was beefed up to include all deliberate and malicious acts, by words or visible representations, aimed at outraging anyone’s religious feelings and the maximum punishment was extended from two to ten years and/or a fine. The aim was to clamp down on rising communal passions amidst Hindu demands for independence from the British and Muslim demands for separate electorates. The real mischief came in 1982, 1984 and 1986 in Pakistan when General Zia ul Haq increasingly relied upon the religious parties for political legitimacy and decreed so-called Islamic edicts which enveloped “desecration” of the Holy Quran and use of derogatory remarks in respect of the Holy Prophet (pbuh). The critical “willful intent” conditionality behind any such outrage, even by “innuendo or imputation or insinuation”, was removed and the sweeping punishment of death or life imprisonment was made a weapon in the hands of mullahs against their secular or mundane opponents. In time, these laws were exploited to settle property or personal disputes not just between Muslims and non-Muslims but also amongst Muslims themselves.

In 2000, another military dictator, General Pervez Musharraf, professed “enlightened moderation” to woo the West and promised to end the embarrassing exploitation of these laws. But, like Gen Zia earlier, he too reneged on his pledge when he cemented an electoral alliance with the mullahs in 2002. In the last few years, feeble anti-blasphemy law voices in parliament and civil society have been drowned out by the self-righteous and cowardly rhetoric of the majority.

To his credit, the PPP’s President Asif Zardari is considering a mercy petition from Aasia Bibi to commute her death sentence , which he is entitled to do by law, even as a High Court is about to review her conviction . As the mullahs gather to protest any dilution of the law or punishment – which has nothing to do with Islamic theory or practice because the Prophet Mohammad (pbuh) forgave all blasphemers in his time – there are two points of view in civil society: one insists that pressure should be brought to bear on the courts to acquit Aasia on the basis of due process of law and evidence, thereby institutionalizing the judiciary’s freedom from fear of the mullahs; the other wants to lean on President Zardari to send a strong signal to all and sundry at home and abroad by pardoning Aasia and pre-empting the courts.

The best course of action would be to officially protect Aasia from harm in prison, help her mount a stout legal defence in the High Court and get her acquitted, failing which the President could set her free. He could do much better by instructing his coalition partners to suitably amend an atrociously unjust and exploitative law that defames Pakistan and harms its citizens.

Murder of history- Myths, fables and lies

Raza Rumi
K K Aziz saw that ‘History’ in his beloved country had turned into sham-narratives and national myths

Adjust Font Size



A textbook, as Aziz notes, mentions Maulana Maudoodi among the “founders of the ideology of Pakistan”, when in fact the right-wing leader bitterly opposed the creation of Pakistan

K Aziz’s seminal study, ‘The Murder of History’ is essential to understand what went wrong in Pakistan. The most worrying sign of an insecure and fissured polity is when it reinvents, twists and lies about its history especially relating to its genesis and progress. K K Aziz was not an Indian nationalist, nor a screaming ideologue who wanted Pakistan to fritter away. In fact his early work The Making of Pakistan remains an essential reading on how Pakistan came into being. He believed in Pakistan despite his emotional links to the separated eastern part of the Punjab. However, at the zenith of his career he could not conceal his deep anguish and disappointment with the way ‘History’ in his beloved country had turned into sham-narratives comprising fables, myths and outright deceit.

Three brutal realities by the end of Zia era were clear: Pakistan’s military-bureaucracy complex had reinvented an ideological state based on a sectarian worldview; History was an instrument of propagating this ideology; and the jihad factories were flourishing. Jinnah’s Pakistan had been irreversibly shattered and perhaps destroyed. For K K Aziz’s generation this was nothing short of a great betrayal.

Published in the early 1990s, ‘The Murder of History’ for the first time documented a meticulous analysis of the history books taught in Pakistani schools and colleges. The book revolves around the main argument that History and Pakistan Studies curricula was nothing more political propaganda aimed at indoctrinating young minds through half-truths and blatant falsehoods.

In this study, Aziz scrutinized over 65 textbooks, which have been promoting prejudice, xenophobia and discrimination in our young children (who have grown up now). According to the Aziz, the publication of such textbooks was the responsibility of the provincial textbook boards but the National Review Committee of the Federal Education Ministry had appropriated the role of approving the ‘ideological’ content.

Aziz starts with how the Pakistan movement is disfigured. How lies about Jinnah are perpetrated (for instance about his education, leanings etc.) and how military rule and wars are glorified that too without credible facts. The most incisive part pertains to the events of 1971. Aziz questions this obviously false account found in one of the textbooks: “In the 1971 war, the Pakistan armed forces created new records of bravery, and the Indian forces were defeated everywhere.” He further traces how the Pakistani Hindus in East Pakistan are blamed for engineering anti-Urdu demonstrations during Jinnah’s time. This movement started by ‘Hindus’ had sowed the seeds of separation of East Pakistan, if the disingenuous sham-historians of the state were to be believed. Aziz questions how the great surrender of Pakistan Army in December 1971 happened apparently when our troops were bagging so-called victories on all fronts. Furthermore, Aziz also dismisses the notion that accepting Bengali cultural values, as a part of national heritage, was some sort of a national humiliation.

A textbook, as Aziz notes, even mentions Maulana Maudoodi among the “founders of the ideology of Pakistan”, when in fact the right-wing leader bitterly opposed the creation of Pakistan and called Jinnah a non-Muslim. Zia ensured that an unconstitutional overthrow of Bhutto’s government was due to an ‘un-Islamic system’. Little wonder, Al-Qaeda and its partners are busy telling us why democracy should be rejected in the Islamic Pakistan. The greatest lie as detected by Aziz’s meticulous pen relates how the arrival of Zia-ul-Haq was celebrated: “General Zia ul Haq was chosen by destiny to be the person who achieved the distinction of imposing Islamic law.... The real objective of the creation of Pakistan, and the demand of the masses, was achieved.”

Aziz also records major omissions and makes a robust effort to correct them in the later chapters. The last parts of the book analyse the impact of such chicanery on the students and on the nation at large: Assuming that three students come from one nuclear home, we have at least eight million households where these books are in daily use … Eight million homes amount to eight million parents (father plus mother), not counting other family members... In this way the nonsense written in the books is conveyed to another sixteen million persons.

After reading Murder , one is left distressed with the unethical principles that the governments and the textbook boards follow while preparing textbooks. This is not just a matter of school curricula as Aziz rather presciently argues: Some of the people bred on these books become journalists, columnists and editors of popular magazines and digests ... making all possible allowances for’ the margin of duplication, we are still left with a very conservative figure of say thirty million people being told what they should not be told and hearing what they should not hear. When we recall that this group contains within itself the social and intellectual elite and the actual or potential leadership of the country, we have nothing but stark despair staring us in the face and promising rack and ruin.

The rot has already set in. Popular media and generations raised on lies are now a formidable reality of our national discourse. Sections of print media and some TV anchors churn out such half-truths on a daily basis. Above all, the youth (as noted by many surveys) are confused about their identity with an ingrained anti-India sentiment and a vague sense of Pan-Islamic identity.

A decade and a half later when Musharraf tried to reform the curricula his attempts were foiled by powerful ideologues within the Establishment and very soon he lost the will to drive this reform. When the Aga Khan Foundation took the initiative in Karachi, the Mullahs threatened and roared. The current PPP government’s education policy makes no concrete commitment to the textbooks. Aziz’s last line remains relevant: “Is anybody listening?”

Pakistan’s existential battle is inextricably linked to the poison of these textbooks. Without a concerted effort to purge our curricula of xenophobia, jingoism and Islamo-fascism, we are simply doomed. The political elites have a small window of opportunity. If they are not going to forge a consensus on textbooks’ reform, their relevance in the long term remains uncertain. This is why K K Aziz’s legacy is formidable and needs to be reiterated every now and then.

Hate Literature We Call Textbooks

Hate literature we call textbooks
Khaled Ahmed Official textbooks excite exclusion and violence by firstly defining the ‘other’, and secondly redefining the self so stringently that certain communities become automatically excluded before becoming victims of violence
Adjust Font Size Pakistan insincerely signed agreements about purging its books of hatred of India and religions other than Islam, but in 2010, Pakistan is more narrow-minded when its literacy rate is over 60 percent, than in 1947 when its literacy rate was 20 percent hen nations go to war, they usually plead disputes relating to boundaries, but the real cause of war is always in the mind, and the mind is prepared over time through messages buried in the textbooks. National wars can’t be executed without a uniform national mind and national mind can’t be created without first artificially creating a national psyche. This job is done through textbooks made to serve as cruel injections of falsehood into the nation’s children. Education can enrich nations economically through skills; education can also poison them and retard them. Defining the ‘other’ through a ‘master narrative’: This evil function of education is called the creation of the ‘other’. This ‘other’ can be an enemy without or an enemy within. Who can stop a state that designates enemy states beyond the national frontier from designating the enemy within? The external enemy can be created through a concocted national memory, but most often it is easily created through religion. And religion cuts two ways. It cuts into the internal fabric of the state much more cruelly because ‘exclusion’ of communities living within the state can be accomplished more easily. In other words, the master narrative that permeates the official textbooks tends to act as a mithridatic against the violence emanating from within rebuking the state for being quiescent. The official textbook may excite to exclusion and violence by two methods: first is to define the ‘other’ and second is to redefine the self so stringently that certain communities become automatically excluded before becoming victims of violence. Pakistan has been cruelly undermined by what is called the Curriculum Wing in the federal Ministry of Education where nationalism is defined through prescriptions thought up by those entrusted with the ‘identity’ of the state. Pakistan has been on the back-step defending its half-literate mind-developers of the Curriculum. It has insincerely signed agreements about purging its books of hatred of India and religions other than Islam, but it has not been able to correct its ‘hate problem’. In 2010, Pakistan is more narrow-minded when its literacy rate is over 60 percent than in 1947 when its literacy rate was 20 percent. John Dewey said if education is packaged wrong it is better to remain illiterate. Because of the ideological content of its textbooks, the more literacy there is in Pakistan the more narrow-minded it will become, threatening the world with its ‘non state actors’. In other words, Pakistan is endangered by literacy. Musharraf backed off from textbooks: Musharraf knew what he was facing in the realm of writing textbooks. He wanted the hate-manufacturing aspects of the Curriculum Wing removed but could do nothing mainly because the material needed to be purged related to the status of the army in Pakistan and was considered pivotal to the shaping of Pakistani nationalism. When hate-books caused the Northern Areas to go up in flames – instead of India – his education minister actually asserted that no change was even intended by the government in the realm of textbook-writing. Daily Nawa-e-Waqt (24 Dec 2006) quoted federal education minister General (Retd) Javed Ashraf Qazi as saying that there was no move to remove Islamic content from textbooks, but the case of style of namaz in one textbook had to be changed for fear of violence in the Northern Areas. He said instructions for the saying of namaz were not acceptable to the people of Northern Areas who had reacted to the textbook and killed 60 people and burned five schools to the ground while for 9 months there was total closure of all schools. He said the textbook had to be changed for that reason. (And not because it was wrong in principle to sow hatred among the people.) Hate textbooks discussed and approved: In 2002, an NGO in Islamabad called SDPI got together a group of scholars to examine class one-to-twelve textbooks in the subjects of social sciences/Pakistan Studies, Urdu and English. The books were prepared on the basis of the curriculum set by the Federal Education Ministry in its Curriculum Wing. The Wing had been manned by a certain kind of officers who had served governments of all stripes without any minister challenging their modus operandi. The guidelines were all fashioned in the name of Islamisation, but if a minister had ever to look at the vocabulary used and the direction given by the Wing to provincial textbook boards, he would have tried to reform the Wing, change the civil servants working there and replace them with more enlightened individuals. By and large, education as a subject has not appealed to any intellectual politician, most probably because he feared clash with the country’s ideology. Dr AH Nayyar who had penned the report on textbook was soon taught a lesson on a TV channel through a carefully orchestrated discussion. GEO TV’s host Hamid Mir (25 March 2004) led the discussion with Dr AH Nayyar and his three conservative opponents, Urdu columnist Mr Ataul Haq Qasimi, academic Ms Dushka Syed, and federal education minister Ms Zubaida Jalal. Dr AH Nayyar said that when there was no argument against the truth it was usual in Pakistan to make accusations and level charges. He said that there was no doubt that history was being twisted around in the textbooks. He gave the example of one primary school textbook which declared that the Muslims were massacred and their women raped by Hindus and Sikhs as they crossed over to Pakistan from India. He said the book declared that Sikhs and Hindus were allowed to go to India in safety by Muslims. He gave another example of brainwashing when he said that a textbook declared that in the 1965 war, which started with an invasion by India, Pakistan had conquered Indian territory but when India felt that it was about to be vanquished it went to the Soviet Union and begged for help. The upshot was that Pakistan returned the captured Indian territory. Ms Dushka Syed said that SDPI and its scholars had been given a certain line (from outside) and they were pushing it. She said there was nothing wrong with teaching jihad to children; after all, Islam was not the religion of Christ who taught its followers to turn the other cheek. Why should jihad be wrong when the Americans feel that it is against them? What was required of Pakistan now? Are we supposed to become prostrate in front of India (lait na jayen)? She said our history was full of jihad and the Holy Prophet PBUH himself did jihad. But the SDPI was obstinately against our history. ‘What are we supposed to do? Should we do namastay-namastay ?’ There was injustice being done in Palestine and Israel was crushing the Muslims with impunity. Should Pakistan become Switzerland in these conditions? The SDPI Report was given the same kind of treatment a day earlier, on 24 March 2004, when ARY TV had its host Dr Shahid Masood take up the subject. Musharraf had to back down. How textbooks support militarism: Now we are in the year 2010. The hate content in the textbooks is the same and India continues to be the bugbear with which to arouse the nation to war. The real cause of the crisis of Pakistan is the Pakistani mind, and this mind is created through the textbook curriculum that underpins national education. It has been spelled out in ‘Shaping a nation: An Examination of Education in Pakistan’ (OUP 2010), Edited by Stephen Lyon and Iain Edgar, under Series Editor Ali Khan of LUMS. Ayaz Naseem, who teaches in Canada, has contributed an important paper on what may be at the root of Pakistan’s status of a weak state. His study shows that the Pakistani mind is shaped by textbook militarism which mixes lethally with the Islamic concept of free-wheeling jihad. Of the school textbooks, he writes: ‘The battles and wars of early Muslim adventurers in India such as Mohammad bin Qasim, Mahmood Ghaznavi, Ahmad Shah Abdali, and Sultan Tughlaq are used to normalise war and militarism as cherished activities’ (p151). Recipients of Nishan-e-Haider in wars against India are lionised; Abdus Sattar Edhi and Abdus Salam are ignored. Islamabad controls the textbook content through the Curriculum Division of the Federal Ministry of Education. The author tells us: ‘The curriculum seeks developing an understanding of Hindu-Muslim differences; enhancing the understanding of the forces working against Pakistan; promoting realisation about the Kashmir issue; evaluating of the role of India with reference to aggression’ (p31). The curriculum directives seek to designate India (and by association Hindus) as the ‘other’, develop a siege mentality by learning that there are a number of outside forces working Pakistan, Israel and Jews among them (p152). Ayaz Waseem defines militarism thus: An uncritical and unquestioning acceptance of the ways of the military by the general population of a society (p150). More significantly: ‘The normalcy of war and violence also normalised violence against the domestic ‘other’. Thus, we see in Pakistan how the military and militarism of all shades and hues, whether in the form of religious fanaticism, violence against women, children and minorities, or support for jihadi organisations domestically and internationally has come to be seen as normal’ (p157). Hate textbooks are pan-Islamic: Shahid Javed Burki in his book Changing Perceptions, Altered Reality: Pakistan’s Economy under Musharraf 1999-2006 (OUP 2007) says education is a Muslim problem because the sector is backward in the entire Islamic world, and that ‘the study of Islam was introduced as a compulsory part of the curriculum in Pakistan in the 1970s and the 1980s…in order to placate a small but influential segment of society’ (p.177). The truth is that Pakistan is located in the middle of multiple concentric ideological circles: the circle closest to it is India-centric; the outer circle joins it with the backwardness of the Islamic world. After the Erdogan government has finished with it, Turkey too will be included in this ‘area of darkness’ called the Islamic world. Is the Islamic state doomed? A interesting book Teaching Islam: Textbooks and Religion in the Middle East ; Edited by Eleanor Abdella Doumato & Gregory Starrett (Viva Books 2008) looks at the textbooks in the Muslim world. It takes account of the function of exclusion the state performs to purify itself and make itself more homogeneous. The Muslim obsession with national monism is intense because of low level of expertise of the state in education and its tendency to lean blindly on religion. Usually the invitation to violence against the excluded communities is only implied whereas in some cases, as in Saudi Arabia and Syria, it is quite plain. Invitation to violence against external foes is reactive in nature, relying on the holy edict allowing war in the defensive or resistant mode. Hating the ‘other’ becomes hating oneself: In Egypt, the textbook competes with the extremist unofficial literature and loses out, leading to the conclusion that good textbooks are ineffective when social environment rejects moderation. Saudi textbooks talk of an enemies’ list at the high school level: among the deviants who have assaulted Islam are the Sabaeans (a Saudi reference to Shias in Yemen?), Kharijites, Qarmatians, Zanj, and Ismailis; tribal group spirit (asabiya) of the age of ignorance (jahiliya): the Shu’ubiya controversy during the age of the Umayyads; atheism (zandaqa); and heretical Sufism’ (p.158). The Saudi books easily apostatise those who negate the Wahhabi worldview, implying the punishment of death to those who deviate, relying on the hadith that says, ‘Whoever changes his religion, kill him’. Saying Eid Mubarak to a Christian is like worshipping the Cross, meaning conversion to apostasy and therefore death (p.161). The Saudi textbook also outlaws saying assalam aleikam to a Christian or a non-Muslim, but if a non-Muslim offers the greeting in the Muslim mode it should be answered with wa alaik and not the full salutation (p.166). The Saudi government has removed certain even more primitive contents of the textbooks, only to be attacked by the radical ulema on Al Jazeera, saying the government was taking the Kingdom on the path of infidels (p.173).

Sickness of flood politics - Khaled Ahmed - Friday Times

The flooding in Pakistan in July-August 2010 was a natural calamity that the equal of which it had never experienced before. The deluge came in the wake of a nationwide ‘lower-riparian’ furore, against Punjab by Sindh, and against India by a raucous ‘water-war’ lobby in Pakistan, because of scarcity of water. When the rivers overflowed after rainfall, Pakhtunkhwa-Malakand, Gilgit-Baltistan, Punjab and Sindh were inundated, dislocating 20 million people.

The scale of the calamity was clearly beyond the capacity of an administratively and financially drained state. Instead of concentrating on the crisis, the media made the nation concentrate on the revelations made about Pakistan’s double-faced strategy in Afghanistan made through an LSE research paper and ‘leaks’ in the world press. The floods were ignored and the government was pilloried after President Zardari made the politically unwise decision to leave Pakistan after the onset of the flood. He visited the UK whose prime minister had accused Pakistan of duplicity during his visit in New Delhi. The media became obsessive about ‘ghairat’ (national pride).

Welcome to flood-politics: The flood was further ignored for the following reasons. The media attacked the PPP government and used the flood scenes to emphasise – falsely – that the masses were suffering because of the government. The technique used was to make the stricken population accuse the government of not caring for their plight. The opposition joined in and focused on Zardari’s visit and its various lurid aspects like the visit to a luxury villa in Paris and staying in a posh hotel in the UK. Punjab government couldn’t do much to prevent the millions being displaced but still accused Zardari for not being around to nurse the stricken.

The truth is that there was not much the affected provinces could do. The calamity was just too big. And Pakistan’s ability to govern had been devastated by years of Taliban and Al Qaeda assaults on its cities. Another reason this capacity declined sharply was the media focus on US and India as the producers of the suicide-bombers found prowling the streets of the country. Lack of trust was endemic. Provinces wanted the centre to shell out big money for the rescue and rehabilitation of the stricken population. Punjab asked for 10 billion rupees immediately; Pakhtunkhwa asked for 25 billion. The provinces had not developed their capacity to raise their own funds.

Media repeats its overkill: The 2010 calamity was many times bigger than the 2005 earthquake. Flooding did the sort of damage that the earthquake never did. What was destroyed most crucially was the communication system. There was no way the rescuers could reach the road network. It is not true to say that the civil society did not respond. The response was there but it was delayed by the understandably slow pace of the development of logistics. Not even in Gansu, China, where the economy is growing at a high rate and national foreign exchange reserves are the highest in the world, could the flood-affected population be saved in time.

Flooding easily destabilised the country. The blame for this instability must be borne by the media which learned nothing from the overdrive it went into in 2005, accusing the then government of dereliction. The earthquake suffering was exaggerated and the government condemned during the period that the army was struggling to reach the affected areas. This time too the army – the only organised entity in the country with capacity of outreach without roads – had to take time to plan its rescue campaign. It would be difficult to fault the efforts made by it although the scale of destruction was too large even for its relatively well-equipped response.

Calamities and dismemberment: Natural calamities have not been politically good for Pakistan because of the opportunist interpretations placed on them. In East Pakistan, a historic cyclone was interpreted politically by the opposition to start a campaign that resulted in 1971 in the breakup of Pakistan. In 2005, the Musharraf government was saved by the international community that praised Pakistan for tackling its earthquake effectively. Reproducing what the media said during that crisis would shame many aggressive TV anchors and Urdu columnists today.

Pakistan destabilises itself during crises by becoming xenophobic. The UK, which was hugely maligned – the internal criticism in the UK of his gaffe in New Delhi should have been enough – ended up committing flood aid to the tune of 30 million pounds sterling. The US has committed $71 million thus far. The big friends – Arab countries (except Saudia Arabia), and China - do not yet appear on the list. (Saudia has sent two planeloads of goods and committed $100 million so far, and Chinese ambassador says his country has announced assistance.) If India offers help (New Delhi says it is ready to give $5 million) Pakistan will most probably not open the Wahga border. And if it does, it will register no gratitude because of ‘ghairat’.

Flood as punishment for sins: No one minds those who accuse the stricken population of sinning. According to Express (11 Aug 2010) chief of Jamaatud Dawa Hafiz Saeed appealed to all Pakistanis to pray to Allah and sincerely ask Him to forgive them for the sins for which He is punishing them. Similar appeals of ‘contrition of sins’ were made by Maulana Haneef Jalundhari chief of Pakistan’s top madrassa in Multan, and the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb and great scientist, Dr AQ Khan. Surprisingly, MQM’s Farooq Sattar too has joined the chorus in misplaced populism.

Quoted in Jinnah (13 Aug 2010) Jamaat Islami chief Dr Munawwar Hassan asked the Muslims to pray for forgiveness from Allah as the floods were sent down as calamity (azab) from Allah for sins committed by them. Jihadi publication Al Qalam editorialised that floods were an indication that the nation of Pakistan had committed certain acts (lagh-zashain) that were not good in the eyes of Allah who had sent down the calamity. The editorial said that the Quran was the authority behind this opinion. Voltaire (1694-1778) blasphemed against the Church of Rome when he condemned the latter for interpreting plague as punishment for sins.

Calamity as cause of fall of government: In 2005, the banned jihadi organisations were let out to rescue people from the earthquake. It immediately led to the ouster of the NGOs from areas where the jihadis were operating. It later on led to the weakening of the position of General Musharraf within the army. His ability to control the jihadis who had tried to kill him a number of times declined, which led to the new aggression shown by Lal Masjid and its supporters within the state. After that, Sipah Sahaba staged its largest show of force in Islamabad in 2006 which was followed by Musharraf’s operation against a greatly emboldened Lal Masjid, in which he was defeated in 2007.

The jihadis are once again in the field. This time the affected areas are nearer home and the population ready to reward their efforts with loyalty to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. (Jihadi publications are back in circulation after the 2006 ban and a booklet of Al Zawahiri rejecting the Constitution of Pakistan is being mailed to people in the big cities.) Reported in Jang (11 Aug 2010) the Taliban spokesman Azam Tariq, named after a killer of the Shia in Pakistan, announced that if Pakistan returned the American aid the Talban were willing to pay $20 million as a substitute fund. And if the Pakistan government assured security, the Taliban were ready to distribute charity and do rescue and relief work in the flood-affected areas.

Talibanisation of the flood: Reported in the jihadi Jaish-e-Muhammad publication Al Qalam (13 Aug 2010) Al Rehmat Trust had gone into motion in the flood-stricken areas of Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab with its thousands of volunteers helping 3,439 victims in one week in Pakhtunkhwa. It was helping families in Nowshehra, Malakand and Akora Khatak, giving food worth Rs 1100 per family. In Punjab it was active in Rahimyar Khan, Muzaffargarh, Taunsa, Kot Addu and Leiyah. Al Rehmat, attached to Jaish-e-Muhammad, was in coordination with Al Shafi Medical Welfare Organisation.

Pakistan’s flood could be on the brink of Talibanisation, followed by a rise in the hold of the banned terrorist organisations over the masses. The Pakistan army is stretched to its limits rescuing people as well as fighting the Taliban in Waziristan and Orakzai. That Pakistan’s posture is confrontational vis-à-vis India and the US will not help in the coming days when estimates of the damage sustained by it will become public and the world will be found reluctant to help a strategically confused state.